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CASE COMMENTS

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: RATIFYING SUSPICIONLESS CANINE
SNIFFS: DOG DAYS ON THE HIGHWAYS
Illinois v. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. 834 (2005)
Jeffrey A. Bekiares * **
Respondent, a motorist on an Illinois highway, was arrested and
charged with one count of cannabis trafficking in contravention of chapter
720, section 550/5.1(a) of the Illinois Code.' An Illinois State trooper
pulled Respondent over for traveling 6 miles per hour in excess of the
speed limit.2 The trooper radioed to the dispatcher that he was making the
stop.3 Meanwhile, a second trooper, who was part of the Illinois State
Police Drug Interdiction Team, overheard the transmission4 and informed
the dispatcher that he was going to bring his canine unit to the scene to
conduct a sniff.5 The first trooper approached the vehicle, informed the
driver that he was speeding, and requested registration documents. 6 The
trooper then requested that the driver accompany him back to the patrol
car, 7 where the trooper told the driver that he was only going to write him
a warning for speeding.' At this time, the trooper also requested

* For my dad Wayne-the inspiration; for my mom Susan-the wisdom; and for my
brother Mike-the role model. I hope the apple doesn't fall too far from the tree.
** Editor's Note: This Case Comment received the George W. Milam Award for the best
Case Comment written during Spring 2005.
1. People v. Caballes, 802 N.E.2d 202, 202 (Ill. 2003).
2. Id. at 203.
3. Id.
4. Id. The record does not disclose that there was any communication over the radio
between the two troopers during the incident. Id.
5. Id. A canine sniff consists simply of walking a dog around the exterior of the vehicle
while the handler watches for the dog to "alert" to any portion of the vehicle. Id.
6. Id. At this point, the trooper made several observations regarding the overall appearance
of the vehicle; specifically, the trooper observed that there was an atlas on the floor, two suits
hanging in the back seat, and that the car smelled of air freshener. Id. The Illinois Supreme Court
would later determine that these observations collectively were not enough to support any
reasonable, articulable suspicion that the driver was engaged in drug trafficking. Id. at 204-05.
7. Id. at 203. A request for a driver to exit his vehicle is neither unusual nor typically subject
to challenge on the grounds of expanding the scope of a seizure. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434
U.S. 106, 109-11 (1977). The Supreme Court held in Atwater v. City ofLago Vista, 532 U.S. 318,
354 (2001), that probable cause to believe a crime has been committed justifies arrest for even de
minimus infractions.
8. Caballes,802 N.E.2d at 203.
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permission to search Respondent's car, but was denied consent.9 The
canine unit then arrived, and the dog was walked around Respondent's car
while the trooper wrote the warning. " The dog "alerted" to Respondent's
trunk in less than one minute.1 ' A subsequent search of the trunk revealed
marijuana. 12 At trial, Respondent's motion to suppress the drugs found in
the trunk was denied.' 3 Respondent was convicted, and the appellate court
affirmed. 14 The Illinois Supreme Court concluded that the canine sniff was
an unreasonable expansion of the reason justifying the stop and therefore
was an unlawful search.' 5 The United States Supreme Court reversed and16
HELD, under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution,
a canine sniff conducted during a lawful traffic stop that reveals no
information other than the presence or absence of contraband is not a
search and is not subject to any heightened standard of reasonable
suspicion. 17
The protection against unreasonable searches and seizures has been
considered fundamental at both the federal and state levels.'" There is
significant historical evidence, however, suggesting that, as originally
conceived, the Fourth Amendment was not intended to extend beyond
protection of the home.' 9 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has slowly

9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. The Respondent evidently made no appeals with respect to the reliability of the dog
and handler team. Such challenges often focus on either the dog's training or whether the dog's
reaction constitutes an "alert." See, e.g., Matheson v. State, 870 So. 2d 8, 12-15 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)
(noting that use of a dog that has been trained is not sufficient to establish probable cause to search
a container after the dog reacts to the container because the handler must reasonably believe that
the dog's reaction was an "alert").
12. Caballes,802 N.E.2d at 203.
13. Id.
14. People v. Caballes, 797 N.E.2d 250 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (published without opinion).
15. Caballes,802 N.E.2d at 205. The Illinois Supreme Court did not expressly state whether
it was deciding the case based on Article I, section 6 of the Illinois Constitution or Amendment IV
of the U.S. Constitution. Both provisions are substantially the same, compare U.S. CONST. amend.
IV,with ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6, but the distinction is important since Illinois is free to construe its
constitutional provisions beyond the minimum federal protections. People v. Cox, 782 N.E.2d 275,
287 (Ill. 2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Illinois has traditionally chosen, however, to mirror the
federal decisions on the Fourth Amendment. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause .
I.."
Id.
17. Illinois v. Caballes, 125 S.Ct. 834, 838 (2005).
18. For example, compare U.S. CONST. amend. IV, with FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12, ILL. CONST.
art. I, § 6, and IOWA CONST. art. I, § 8. For a discussion of the early state adoptions of the Fourth
Amendment, see Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the OriginalFourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L.
REv. 547 (1999).
19. See, e.g.,David E. Steinberg, The OriginalUnderstandingofUnreasonableSearchesand
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expanded the protections of the Fourth Amendment to reach a variety of
contexts outside of the home that include situations in which a person
manifests an "actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and... [where]
the expectation
[is] one that society is prepared to recognize as
2 The Supreme
'reasonable.""'
Court has further noted that certain searches,
in the traditional sense of the word, do not constitute "searches" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.2"
The Court first addressed the Fourth Amendment ramifications of
canine sniffs in the context of an airport luggage search. In the seminal
case of United States v. Place,22 the Court considered the question of
whether a canine sniff constitutes a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.23 In Place, law enforcement officers at an airport in
Miami became suspicious of the respondent because of his peculiar
behavior.24 Nevertheless, he was allowed to fly to his destination in New
York, where other law enforcement officers had been alerted to his
arrival." After failing to receive consent to search the respondent's
baggage, the officers detained his effects and informed him that they were
going to seek a warrant to open the baggage.26 The officers then moved the
baggage to another airport and subjected it to a canine sniff, during which
a dog alerted to one bag.27 The respondent was arrested after the bag was
found to contain cocaine.28 His conviction at the trial level, however, was
reversed when the court of appeals determined that the detention of his
baggage for such an extended period of time between the initial encounter
and the canine sniff was unreasonably lengthy.29

Seizures, 56 FLA. L. REv. 1051, 1079-80 (2004).
20. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
21. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182-84 (1984) (holding that a search of open
fields in view of officers did not implicate the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Jacobsen, 466
U.S. 109, 125-26 (1984) (holding that a field test on a substance that reveals only whether the
substance is contraband would not implicate the Fourth Amendment).
22. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
23. Id. at 706-07. Technically, the Court's discussion of the canine sniff was dicta, as it was
not necessary to determine that the seizure of defendant's luggage was unconstitutional. This point
was vociferously advanced in Justice Blackmun's concurrence and probably formed the basis of
much of the subsequent confusion over the status of canine sniffs. Id. at 723 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
24. Id. at 698.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 699.
27. Id. The time that elapsed from the initial seizure to the sniff was approximately ninety
minutes. Id. Once the dog had alerted, however, the officers had to wait over a weekend to obtain
a search warrant to open the baggage. Id. The respondent had declined to accompany the officers
to the other airport. Id.
28. Id.
29. United States v. Place, 660 F.2d 44, 53 (2d Cir. 1981).
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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals, concluding that the officers had detained the baggage too
long.3" In its discussion of the case, however, the Court opened the
floodgate to two new channels, which would expand the permissibility of
searches in a variety of contexts. The first of these channels was the further
ratification of applying the reasonable suspicion standard from Terry v.
Ohio31 outside of the typical stop-and-frisk situations.32 The Second Circuit
applied this standard in Place, even though doing so continued the
controversial expansion of the scope of searches permissible under
reasonable suspicion from exclusively personal safety searches to
evidence-gathering searches as well. 3 The Supreme Court considered this
approach acceptable, and it specifically recognized that reasonable
suspicion could be used to justify brief seizures of any baggage suspected
of containing contraband or evidence of a crime.34 The second channel
opened was the recognition that canine sniffs, at least in the context of this
case, do not implicate the Fourth Amendment.35 The Court reached this
conclusion by noting the limited level of intrusion upon privacy that a
canine sniff creates.36 As such, the Court categorized the canine sniff as sui
generis among search techniques.3" Thus, the Court concluded that the
exposure of the respondent's baggage to a canine sniff did not constitute
a search under the Fourth Amendment.38
Seventeen years after the Place decision, in City of Indianapolis v.

30. Place, 462 U.S. at 710.
31. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The Terry case was a significant departure from traditional notions
of Fourth Amendment protections that rested on probable cause for almost all searches. In Terry,
the Court authorized personal searches of suspects in limited situations where officer safety is at
stake on grounds of reasonable suspicion of crime, rather than full-blown probable cause. Id. at 30.
This decision authorized the now familiar stop-and-frisk technique used by police. Id. at 30-31. The
Terry stop has been applied in several contexts. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873,
880-81 (1975) (applying reasonable suspicion standard to border searches); United States v. BoteroOspina, 71 F.3d 783,787 (10th Cir. 1995) (applying the reasonable, articulable suspicion standard
to traffic stops).
32. Place, 462 U.S. at 702.
33. Place, 660 F.2d at 50. Courts have been reticent to expand the scope of the narrow
probable cause exception established in Terry. This principle was expounded in Dunawayv. New
York, 442 U.S. 200, 210 (1979) (relaying the Court's carefulness not to expand the scope of
reasonable suspicion, but further enumerating the limited contexts in which it has been applied).
34. Place, 462 U.S. at 702.
35. Id. at 707.
36. Id. Specifically, the Court observed that a canine sniff does not expose non-contraband
items to public view (as a traditional search might) and that a properly conducted sniff reveals
information only about the presence or absence of contraband within the container. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. The narrowness of this part of the holding is significant. The Court specifically notes
that the baggage was in a "public place" and the exposure was to a "trained canine." Id.
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Edmond, 9 the Court' considered canine sniffs in the context of motorist
traffic.4" In Edmond, law enforcement had established a roadblock
checkpoint to screen drivers randomly for narcotics.4 Police walked drug
dogs around the outside of each vehicle that had been diverted from the
roadway.4" Respondents filed a lawsuit on behalf of themselves and the
class of motorists who had been stopped, claiming that the checkpoints
violated the Fourth Amendment.43 The trial court held that the checkpoint
did not violate the Fourth Amendment, 44 but the appellate court reversed.4"
The Supreme Court affirmed on the basis that the primary purpose of
the roadblock was indistinguishable from the general interest in crime
control. 46 This holding confirmed the Court's disapproval of roadblocks
'
which are based on neither individualized suspicion nor "special needs."47
The Court found that drug enforcement simply cannot be considered an
extraordinary circumstance that would justify such an intrusion. 48 In its
discussion of the canine component of the search, however, the Court
reaffirmed the logic of Place.49 In finding that "walk[ing] a narcoticsdetection dog around the exterior of each car.., does not transform the
seizure into a search,"5° the Court opened the door for canine sniffs to be
used at any checkpoint that is lawful at its inception. Indeed, in perhaps a
prescient moment, the Court specifically declined to address the legality
of stops where canine sniffs might be used in circumstances wholly
unrelated to drug interdiction. 5' This holding reinforced the logic of Place
39. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
40. Id.at 40. In Edmond,as in Place,the Court's treatment of the canine sniff issue left many
questions unresolved that future courts would struggle with. This is because the canine sniff was
not the primary issue in either case, but rather, was an ancillary point that the Court felt compelled
to address. Id. at 47-48; Place,462 U.S. at 711 (Brennan, J., concurring).
41. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 34-35. The vehicles were stopped according to a pre-determined
sequence and without police discretion, and each stop generally lasted no longer than five minutes.
Id. at 35.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 36.
44. Edmond v. Goldsmith, 38 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1028 (S.D. Ind. 1998).
45. Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183 F.3d 659, 666 (7th Cir. 1999).
46. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 48.
47. Id. at 47-48. The State relied heavily on cases which upheld roadblocks in situations of
special needs. See Brief for Petitioners at 7, City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000)
(No. 99-1030).
48. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42-43.
49. Id. at 40.
50. Id.
5 1. Id. at 47 n.2. The dissent in Edmond made a forceful argument that the only difference
between the roadblock in that case and the one that the Court approved of in Mich. Dept. of State
Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990), was the presence of a dog. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 52-53
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In Sitz, the Court held that a roadblock designed for the sole purpose of
detecting drunk driving did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455. Therefore,
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to reassure law enforcement that conducting searches with canine
enhancement does not implicate the Fourth Amendment.
The following year, however, the Court invalidated a search that used
sensory enhancement to detect details of the home.52 In Kyllo v. United
States,53 the Court considered whether a thermal imaging device could be
used by police to determine the relative amount of heat emitted in a
residence, in an attempt to detect if marijuana was being grown inside. 4
The police used the device to scan a portion of the petitioner's house, and
they determined that the portion they scanned was relatively hot compared
to other portions. 55 Based partly on the results of this scan, a Federal
Magistrate issued a search warrant for the home; a subsequent search
revealed more than one hundred marijuana plants. 6 The District Court
found that the search warrant was valid, and the appellate court affirmed. 7
The Supreme Court reversed, deciding to suppress the evidence as the
fruit of an illegal search.5 ' The Court focused its reasoning on both the
nature of the device and the location to be searched. With regard to the
device, the Court found that obtaining details of a "'constitutionally
protected area' by sensory-enhancing equipment-which could not be
otherwise obtained without a physical intrusion-is proscribed. 9 This
statement was qualified, however, with a suggestion that if the device was
"in general public use," the search might be acceptable.6 ° With regard to
the location, the Court reiterated its belief that the Fourth Amendment
draws "'a firm line at the entrance to the house. ,,6' Although the
Government contended that only non-intimate details of the home were
being captured, the majority rejected this argument by noting first that the

states could simply initiate their roadblocks for a lawfully recognized special need and have a drug
sniffing dog present as a secondary measure. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 55-56 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
52. Sensory-enhancing surveillance has been a source of great challenge and exception since
the early days of Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 469 (1928) (holding that wiretapping
did not amount to a search). The logic of Olmstead has since been rejected, and such surveillance
is now regulated by a variety of legislation. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2005) (permitting wiretapping
for investigative purposes typically only under regulated circumstances and court supervision).
53. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
54. Id. at 29.
55. Id. at 29-30.
56. Id. at 30.
57. Id. at 30-31.

58. Id. at 40-41.
59. Id. at 34 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)).
60. Id.This suggestion appears to come from the Court's notions about reasonable
expectations of privacy. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring). If such a device is known to be in widespread use, perhaps the expectation that it will
not be directed at any one given person is diminished. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
61. Kyllo, 553 U.S. at 40 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980)).
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distinction between '"
off-the-wall "' observations and "' through-the-wall'"
observations is illusory,62 and second that any details of the home can be
considered intimate details.63 The Court combined this logic to hold that
such surveillance is, in fact, a search and, as such, is presumptively
unreasonable without a warrant. 6
The instant Court distinguished Kyllo by emphasizing the divide
between sensory enhancements that, like a canine, detect only unlawful
activity and those that, like a thermal imager, could potentially reveal
lawful private information.65 In the instant case, since the Respondent had
no right to reasonably expect privacy in concealing illegal material, the
canine search did not reach to a cognizable level of constitutional
infringement.' In reaching this conclusion, the instant Court grounded its
logic on a reaffirmation of its holding in Place.7 Since well-trained canine
sniffs disclose only the presence or absence of a contraband substance,
they are considered sui generis." In the instant case, the traffic stop itself
was concededly lawful at its inception, and it was not found to be
impermissibly delayed.69 As such, the instant Court felt that the Illinois
Supreme Court had erred in determining that the canine sniff was the cause
ofa constitutional violation.7" This conclusion was essentially a ratification
of the scenario imagined in Edmond, as the instant Court pronounced that
conducting a canine sniff does not change the character of an otherwise
lawful traffic stop. 7
By ratifying the use of canine sniffs in the context of traffic stops
absent any reasonable, articulable suspicion of the presence of drugs, the
Court sidestepped serious issues of reliability, which would be better
addressed by the application of the Terry standards. The Illinois Supreme
Court's attempt to apply Terry standards to traffic stops of this nature had
a credible measure ofprecedential support.72 That court' s main proposition
62. Id.at 35-36. Specifically, the Court dismisses this distinction by pointing out that all
external observations of an enclosed space can be considered "off-the-wall" since only information
that escapes the space is detected. Ad. Such information, however, always reveals details about the
contents of the enclosure. Id. This distinction, the Court noted, was rejected by the logic of Katz.

Id.
63.
example,
64.
65.

Id. at 37-39. The oft-quoted language used here is: "[tlhe [device] might disclose, for
at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath." Id. at 38.
Id. at 40.
Illinois v. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. 834, 838 (2005).

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
pursuant

Id. at 837-38.
Id.
Id. at 838.
Id. at 837.
Id.
Id.
See United States v. Jones, 269 F.3d 919, 924 (8th Cir. 2001) (confining investigations
to traffic stops to the scope of the circumstances that justified the stop according to Terry);
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was that a canine sniff should be treated as an expansion of the scope of
a traffic stop.73 The canine sniff would therefore still be permissible, but
only after an independent suspicion of further criminal wrongdoing is
formed by the officer.74 Indeed, if there was a misapplication of Place by
the Illinois court, it was most likely due to the unclear scope of that
holding. Since Place itself dealt with a situation in which the police
already had reasonable suspicion that the defendant was carrying drugs,
Place's rationale could easily have been interpreted to mean that
subsequent police encounters in similar situations would also require
reasonable suspicion.75
The Illinois Supreme Court's attempt to extend the Terry protections
to canine sniffs at traffic stops would seem to travel a middle road between
the needs of law enforcement and the protection of privacy76 by inserting
at least a moderate level of judicial scrutiny into canine sniff situations.
This approach was favored, in this instant case, by the dissenting opinion
of Justice Ginsburg, where she voiced her preference for application of the
Terry standard to determine if the canine sniff impermissibly expanded the
scope of the search.77 Nevertheless, the instant Court chose to decline the
extension of Terry protections to this context, and once again simply
excised the canine sniff portion of the Place holding to stand alone.7" In

cf Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 (1984) (likening standard traffic stops to Terry
stops, but noting that stops based on probable cause might be subject to different standards).
73. People v. Caballes, 802 N.E.2d 202, 204 (Ill. 2003).
74. This would make it similar to the situation in Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106
(1977) (per curiam). In Mimms, a police officer permissibly ordered a motorist out of his car during
a routine traffic stop. Id. at 107, 110-12. Once the officer observed a "bulge" under the defendant's
jacket, he had the necessary reasonable suspicion to authorize a pat-down. Id.at 111-12. As applied
by the Illinois Supreme Court, this standard would subject any further investigation, after
reasonable suspicion had been formed by an officer, to the two-part Terry test. Caballes, 802
N.E.2d at 204. Further guidance on such stops can be found in the dictates enunciated in Florida
v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,500 (1983) (holding an investigative stop must be no longer than necessary
to confirm or dispel the officer's suspicions and must be minimally intrusive).
75. For similar interpretations, see State v. Wiegand,645 N.W.2d 125, 133 (Minn. 2002) and
People v. Ortiz, 738 N.E.2d 1011, 1020 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). Justice Souter also makes this
observation in his dissent in the instant case, in which he notes that the police in Placealready had
independent grounds to suspect that the luggage in question contained contraband before they
employed the canine sniff. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. at 841 n.5 (Souter, J., dissenting).
76. But see Caballes,802 N.E.2d at 207 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority's
desire to extend Terry protections in this context actually weakens Fourth Amendment rights
because such expansion further erodes the idea of probable cause).
77. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. at 844 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Such an approach is also favored
by Fourth Amendment scholar Wayne LaFave, who posits that the right result is reached by
applying the Terry standard in such contexts. Wayne R. LaFave, The "Routine Traffic Stop "from
Start to Finish: Too Much "Routine, " Not Enough FourthAmendment, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1843,
1894-98 (2004).
78. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. at 838.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss4/4
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rejecting the application of the Terry standard to the instant case, the Court
chose instead to answer the question that it had left open in Edmond:
whether a suspicionless canine sniff at an otherwise lawful traffic stop
a search.79 The Court's answer, in no uncertain terms, was
constitutes
"no."8 Such a simple answer, however, necessarily places greater
discretion in the hands of the police (and their canines) than the framers
would have envisioned, as well as tremendous faith in the accuracy of a
technique that immediately grants law enforcement probable cause for a
full-blown warrantless search.8
That the Court has decided to treat canine sniffs as non-searches even
without articulable suspicion demonstrates a willingness to ignore salient
and growing evidence on false positives.8 2 The Court reiterates time and
again that since canine sniffs only reveal the presence or absence of
contraband, they are minimally intrusive in nature and deserve sui generis
classification. 3 A multitude of credible evidence, however, has shown that
the reliability of canine sniffs in certain contexts is questionable." Justice
Souter warns of this risk in his dissent, in which he notes that "[t]he
infallible dog.., is a creature of legal fiction." 5 Respondent, in the instant
case, relied heavily on evidence that false positives can occur for a number
of reasons, including drug-tainted money and handler error.8 6 The Court,
however, gives little consideration to this argument and dismisses it simply

79. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32,47 n.2 (2000).
80. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. at 838.
81. E.g., State v. Tucker, 979 P.2d 1199, 1201 (Idaho 1999) (holding that a canine sniff alert
provides the necessary probable cause for a full-blown warrantless vehicle search under the vehicle
exception).
82. See generally Mark Curriden, Courts Reject Drug-TaintedEvidence: Studies Find
Cocaine-Soiled Cash So Prevalent That Even Janet Reno Had Some, 79 A.B.A.J. 22 (1993)
(chronicling courts' growing reticence to accept drug-tainted money as the only evidence of
criminal wrongdoing); Robert Pool, New EquipmentRoundupDazzles Scientists, 243 SCIENCE 1554
(1989) (outlining a study suggesting that almost all US currency is contaminated with traces of
narcotics); Andy Rickman, Note, CurrencyContaminationandDrug-SniffingCanines:ShouldAny
Evidentiary Value be Attached to a Dog's Alert on Cash?, 85 KY. L.J. 199 (1996) (detailing the
process and extent of narcotic contamination in US currency).
83. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. at 838; Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40; United States v. Place, 462 U.S.
696, 707 (1983); see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984) (holding one year
after Placethat a field test for cocaine that could only serve to reveal the presence or absence of
cocaine did not constitute a search).
84. See, e.g., Rickman, supranote 82, at 206-09.
85. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. at 839 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter proceeds to briefly list
some authorities supporting the proposition that canine sniffs can be unreliable in certain contexts,
and he concludes that "[i]n practical terms, the evidence is clear that the dog that alerts hundreds
of times will be wrong dozens of times." Id. at 839-40 (Souter, J., dissenting).
86. Brief for the Respondent at 18-20, Illinois v. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. 834 (2005) (No. 03923).
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2005
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87
by stating that the record contains no support for it.
Ironically, in its dismissal of Respondent's discussion about false
positives, the Court quotes a portion of Respondent's brief that states that
canine sniffs, if "properly conducted," generally reveal only contraband.88
While there can be little doubt that this is true, it is precisely the phrase
"properly conducted" that this contention rests upon and that the majority
ignores. Although most canine sniffs purport to have a stunningly high rate
of accuracy,89 there is reliable statistical evidence to suggest that random
searches, conducted without any individualized suspicion, can produce
abysmal results.9" Situations that might resemble an Edmond roadblock,
therefore, would likely be not only intrusive, but also ineffective. 9 This
situation is further complicated by strong evidence that somewhere
between sixty percent and ninety-five percent of all money in the United
States is contaminated with drugs.92 Under such conditions, a canine sniff
undertaken without at least reasonable suspicion starts to look very
unreasonable indeed.
Most of the theoretical support for finding that a canine sniff
constitutes a search seems to come from comparisons with Kyllo.9 3 The
Court's distinction of Kyllo in the instant case, however, is brief and

87. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. at 838.
88. "[D] rug sniffs are designed, and if properly conducted are generally likely, to reveal only
the presence of contraband." Id. (quoting Brief for the Respondent at 17, United States v. Caballes,
125 S. Ct. 834 (2005) (No. 03-923).
89. Practitioners regularly report accuracy above ninety percent. Robert C. Bird, An
Examination of the TrainingandReliability ofthe Narcotics DetectionDog, 85 KY. L.J. 405, 428
(1996).
90. In his article, Bird produces a statistical example of how high error rates can occur in
random sample populations. Using numbers estimates of the percentage of the population that
might possess narcotics (0.5%), Bird calculates that an overall success rate in a randomly sampled
population of 10,000 people could be as low as twenty percent. Id. at 427-28.
91. For one such example of poor results, see Merrett v. Moore, 58 F.3d 1547, 1549 (1I1th
Cir. 1995) (documenting the results of a two-day Florida narcotics roadblock in which
approximately 1,450 vehicles were sniffed, and noting that alerts to 28 vehicles that resulted in fullblown searches led to only one arrest for narcotics).
92. See United States v. $506,231 in United States Currency, 125 F.3d 442, 453 (7th Cir.
1997) (taking testimony from the government that no one can place much weight on the results of
canine sniffs because at least one-third of all US currency is tainted with cocaine); Lord v. State,
616 So. 2d 1065, 1066 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (noting that currency contamination is so pervasive in
South Florida that traces can be found on much of the currency there); Curriden, supra note 82, at
22; Pool, supranote 82, at 1554-55; Jeff Brazil & Steve Berry, You May Be DrugFree,But Is Your
Money?, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 15, 1992, at A6 (contending that over ninety percent of US
currency in some major cities is likely contaminated with narcotics).
93. E.g., Steinberg, supra note 19, at 1088-90 (asserting that the decisions in Kyllo andPlace
are inconsistent and impossible to reconcile given the similarity in search techniques and the
current state of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
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troublesome.94 The best option probably would have been for the Court to
emphasize the setting of Kyllo as a primary reason for its holding,95 as the
Court in Kyllo was careful to stress that its holding turned on the
reasonable expectations of privacy in the home.96 Privacy in a vehicle, on
the other hand, although recognized, has long been subject to diminished
protection, even before the Katz test was created.97 Indeed, this kind of
analytical approach was favored and already outlined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist in his dissent in Edmond.98 Instead, the instant Court chose to
distinguish Kyllo by focusing on the critical distinction between those
devices that can reveal "intimate" lawful details and those that can reveal
only contraband.99 Such a distinction, however, is once again predicated
on a disregard of evidence of false positives in canine sniff cases.
In its holding, the instant Court avoided the issue of context altogether.
By contending that the canine sniff is a nonsearch, there is no need to even
analyze whether the expectation of privacy in the vehicle's trunk was one
that society was prepared to recognize as reasonable."°0 Making such a
cursory distinction, however, may well ignore the potential for abuse of
this technique.' ° ' The Court, therefore, perhaps should have proffered a
footnote stating that the majority was expressing no opinion on whether a
suspicionless canine sniff would be acceptable in the context of individuals
walking down the street, or even at the homestead itself. This is possibly
the most profound question yet to be answered by the decision in the
instant case: 0 2 Will the Court apply the analysis of Kyllo to a suspicionless
94. Illinois v. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. 834, 838 (2005).
95. Another interesting option for the Court might have been to distinguish Kyllo by noting
that canine sniffs utilize a device (a dog) that is in general public use, whereas the device used in
the Kyllo case was a relatively uncommon thermal imager. Such an approach is intellectually
interesting, but is beyond the scope of this Comment.
96. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
97. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (establishing that, although
privacy interests in vehicles are constitutionally protected, their ready mobility justifies a lesser
degree of protection of these interests); State v. Tucker, 979 P.2d 1199, 1201 (Idaho 1999)
(declaring the validity ofa warrantless search of a vehicle once probable cause had been established
under the vehicle exception).
98. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 54 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
99. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. at 838.
100. This point is pursued by Justice Souter in his dissent, in which he argues that adherence
to Place in this context allows the sniff to escape all Fourth Amendment review. Id. at 838-39
(Souter, J., dissenting).
101. One of the main concerns of Justice Ginsburg's dissent is the potential for random,
suspicionless sniffs of persons and property by police dogs that have simply been loosed onto the
streets. Id. at 845-46 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
102. In his dissent, Justice Souter states that he does not read the majority's opinion as
explicitly holding that dog sniffs "always get a free pass" and therefore that the issue might not be
revisited in a different context. Id. at 842 (Souter, J., dissenting). This may, however, be a wishful
interpretation, as the text of the majority's opinion at the section cited never clearly addresses the

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2005

11

Florida Law Review,
Vol.LAW
57,REVIEW
Iss. 4 [2005], Art. 4
FLORIDA

[Vol. 57

canine sniff of the home in the future, or will it adopt the view of those
circuits that have interpreted the setting in Place (a public place) to be
irrelevant10 3and have held that a canine sniff is not a search in any
context?
The instant case presented the Court with an opportunity to link the
dicta from Place and Edmond to form a general rule exempting canine
sniffs in public places from Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Clarity, however,
can come at the price of inflexibility, and in its decision, the Court treads
a fine public policy line. On the one hand, the public support for the "war
on drugs" demands tough law enforcement measures. The scenario of drug
dogs being loosed on the streets to roam at will, envisioned by Justice
Ginsburg's dissent, however, necessarily gives pause as to how far the
principle that a sniff is not a search can comfortably extend." Despite
these warnings, the instant Court declined to extend the reasonable
suspicion standard to canine sniffs. In so doing, the Court has, in effect,
turned the police canine into a member of the judiciary, by allowing its
senses alone to perform the usual function of the reviewing magistrate in
determining probable cause. The Fourth Amendment may yet reach the
canine nose, but it seems likely that it will not do so until either evidence
of false positives in random search situations becomes overwhelming or
egregious intrusions upon the home begin to occur. 5 Until that time, the
canine sniff will simply remain another search that is not a search.

issue of canine sniffs in other contexts. Id. at 838.
103. CompareUnited States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1366-67 (2d Cir. 1985) (considering
a canine sniff a search because "a practice that is not intrusive in a public airport may be intrusive
when employed at a person's home"), with United States v. Reed, 141 F.3d 644, 649-50 (6th Cir.
1998) (considering a canine sniff of a home not to be a search), United States v. Garcia, 42 F.3d
604, 606 (10th Cir. 1994) (considering a canine sniff of a nonpublic baggage car on a train not to
be a search), United States v. Colyer, 878 F.2d 469,474-77 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (considering a canine
sniff of a train sleeper car not to be a search), and Porter v. State, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 4978, at
*9 n. I (Tex. App. July 11, 2002) (considering a canine sniff of a home not to be a search).
104. Caballes,125 S. Ct. at 845-46 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
105. At this time this Comment was being edited for publication, the question was under close
consideration in Florida. The Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida had held that a canine sniff
that detected narcotics outside a private residence violated the Fourth Amendment. State v. Rabb,
881 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). The Supreme Court, however, recentlyvacated and remanded
the decision for further consideration in light of Caballes.Florida v. Rabb, 125 S. Ct. 2246 (2005).
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